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COULD THERE BE MORE THAN ONE LORD?
T W Bartel

In this article I defend the Social Trinitarian-someone who maintains that
the Trinity consists of three distinct divine individuals-against the objection
that it is metaphysically impossible for each member of a Social Trinity to
exercise the kind of sovereignty over the created world that traditional theists
attribute to a divine being. I consider what I take to be the most forceful
argument for this objection, and construct a reply which, though not conclusive, poses a serious challenge to those who believe that the argument has
much force against Social Trinitarianism.
'Let it be admitted,' writes the anonymous author of an eighteenth-century
Unitarian pamphlet, 'that you had proved the supreme divinity of Christ and
the Holy Spirit, the natural conclusion would have been three distinct Gods,
which is a doctrine expressly condemned by Scripture and reason. '1 I agree
that the 'natural conclusion'-in fact, the only reasonable conclusion-to
draw from the divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is that there are three
distinct divine individuals-a view I shall henceforth call 'the Social Theory
of the Trinity. '2 But I do not agree that the Social Theory is expressly, or
implicitly, condemned by Scripture, tradition, or reason. I shall not attempt
in this paper to demonstrate that Social Trinitarianism can be reconciled with
Scripture and tradition. 3 Nor shall I try to defuse every objection to the Social
Theory that can claim any support from reason. But I shall attempt to complete a modest fragment of the task of defending the philosophical plausibility
of Social Trinitarianism-albeit a fragment that will prove to be of considerable interest not only for Christian philosophers and theologians, but also
for theists in general, and indeed for anyone who cares about the philosophical problems of action, causation, states of affairs and their individuation,
and more. In brief, I shall undertake to defend the Social Theorist against the
charge that it is impossible for each member of a Social Trinity to exercise
the kind of sovereignty over the created world that Christians are obliged to
attribute to God-and so are we forbidden by reason, if not the catholic
religion, to say, There be three Lords. This charge can be supported by quite
a forceful argument; so if my defence succeeds, it will enhance the reputation
of the Social Theory. My examination of this objection will also warn us away
from a tempting, but fatally flawed, interpretation of Social Trinitarianism,
and will enable us to state the Social Theory with unprecedented precision.
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The objection I shall consider epitomises a very common method for trying
to impugn the coherence of Social Trinitarianism: selecting an attribute that
is essential for being fully divine and arguing that this attribute is unshareable-that is, there is no possible world in which more than one being has
this attribute. The stock example of such an attribute is omnipotence. Several
philosophers have recently contended that this property is not unshareable. 4
But there is another divine attribute which has frequently been considered
un shareable; and to the best of my knowledge, no-one has yet attempted to
discredit any of the arguments for this opinion. This attribute is sovereigntyGod's control over everything in the created world. I shall set forth the best
argument I can for the unshareability of divine sovereignty-I will call it 'the
Causal Argument' -and then construct a reply which, though not conclusive,
poses a serious challenge to those who believe that this argument has much
force against the Social Theory of the Trinity.
The Causal Argument aims to demonstrate that it is impossible for more
than one being in each possible world to exercise the sort of sovereign control
over the universe that a being must wield in order to count as divine. This
argument is at least as old as Scotus, but its best formulation to date can be
found in a recent article by William Wainwright-and although I shall suggest
some improvements to this version, my presentation of the argument will
remain very close to his.5
We begin with a principle that has a considerable amount of intuitive
appeal: whenever some state of affairs which obtains at a certain time is
causally sufficient for an effect, nothing else obtaining at that same time is
causally necessary for the same effect. Or, more formally:
1.

For any states of affairs x, y, and z and any time t: if x's obtaining at t
is causally sufficient for y's obtaining, then if z occurs·at t and z is neither
identical to x nor a proper part of x, z is not causally necessary for the
obtaining of y.6

This principle seems to be a necessary truth, and an obvious necessary truth
at that: it appears to flow irresistibly from the concepts of causal necessity
and causal sufficiency. If x is causally sufficient for y, then surely, it seems,
nothing over and above x is needed for y to obtain. Furthermore, 1 can be
bolstered by examples. Consider a case of simultaneous causal overdetermination-a case in which a state of affairs has two simultaneous sets of causally sufficient conditions. Suppose that two independent switches, WI and
W2, are flipped at exactly the same time and that each of the currents that
flows down a wire from each switch reaches the filament of a single bulb at
the same instant, whereupon the bulb lights up. Each of the chains of causes
leading from one of the switches to the filament is in itself causally sufficient
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for the lighting of the bulb. And of course neither of these causal chains is
necessary for the bulb's lighting: if WI had not been turned on but W2 had,
or vice versa, the light would still have come on.
The second premise of the Causal Argument expresses an important element of the traditional doctrine of divine sovereignty. I will use the term
'creature' as a convenient synonym for 'non-divine contingent substance'an actual non-divine substance that does not exist in every possible world.
And I will assume-but only for the moment-a volitional theory of divine
action, according to which every effect that a divine being brings about in
the created world is caused by that being's willing that effect to obtain. We
shall notice later that the Causal Argument can easily dispense with this
assumption, but the argument is more elegant if we retain it.
Now one of the fundamental components of the traditional conception of
divine sovereignty is the claim that no creature can exist apart from God's
creative or sustaining power. In order to formulate this claim precisely, however, we must remove an ambiguity which can easily infect our talk of divine
volitions. The scope of the temporal operator in the sentence
S.

x wills the existence of y at t

may include either the existence of y-so that it should be read as
S 1. x, at an unspecified time (or in the 'timeless present'), wills the state of
affairs denoted by 'y's existing at t'or the willing of x-which means
S2. x,

at

t,

wills the existence of y,

with the time of y's existing left unspecified-or both the existence of y and
the willing of x, which yields
S3. x wills at t the state of affairs denoted by 'y's existing at t.'
I shall use hyphens to indicate that a particular temporal operator applies only
to the state of affairs that is willed, and not to the willing-thus, 'x wills the
existence of y-at-t' is equi valent to S I-and I shall indicate the time of x's
willing (if any) by using 'x's willing at t.'
We are now prepared to state the second premise of the Causal Argument:
2.

For any x, if x is divine, then for every creature y and time t, if y exists
at t then x's willing at t (or in the 'timeless present') the existence of
y-at-t is causally necessary for y's existing-at-t.1

The third premise of the Causal Argument is more elaborate, and needs some
prior explanation. This premise is entailed by, though it does not entail, the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo-the claim that God brought the universe into
being from nothing. One crucial point expressed by this doctrine is that God's
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productive activity is sufficient to bring the universe into existence: God had
no need of anything else, such as pre-existing matter, to create our cosmos.
Some theists go further than this, and maintain that God's activity is sufficient
for the obtaining of every contingent state of affairs. But of course other
theists believe that this goes too far-that, for example, such a conception of
divine activity annihilates human freedom and moral responsibility, since
God would causally predetermine each human choice. Since this ancient
controversy shows no sign at present of disappearing, any argument against
Trinitarianism should resolutely refrain from taking sides on this issue. s Fortunately for the Causal Argument, it can stay out of this dispute-all it
requires for its third premise is the principle that the will of a divine being
is causally sufficient for the existence of at least one creature. That is:
3.

For any x, if x is divine and there exists at least one creature, then there
exists a creature y and a time t such that x's willing at t the existence of
y-at-t is causally sufficient for the existence of y at t.

We shall need a concise term for the attribute which 2 and 3 taken together
ascribe to a divine being-it will not quite do to call it the property of being
such that one s activity is causally necessary for the existence of every creature and causally sufficient for the existence of at least one creature. And
although the conjunction of 2 and 3 does not exhaust the content of the
traditional doctrine of divine sovereignty, I should still think it appropriate
to call this attribute 'sovereignty,' so that any being who satisfies both 2 and
3 is sovereign.
Now if 1, 2, and 3 are all true, the Causal Argument needs only one more
premise in order to demonstrate that the Social Theory of the Trinity is
incoherent:
4.

For any agents x and y, if x is not identical to y, then no act-token
performed by x is identical with any act-token performed by y.

In other words, two act-tokens are identical only if they involve the same agent.
For suppose that the Social Theory is true. Then, given what else we know,
5.

The Father is divine, the Son is divine, the Father is not the same agent
as the Son, and there is at least one creature.

And 3 and 5 jointly entail
6.

At some time t, there exists a creature c such that God the Father's
willing at t the existence of c-at-t (call this act-token 'I) is causally
sufficient for the existence of c at t.

Moreover, 2 and 5 jointly entail
7.

God the Son's willing at t the existence of c-at-t (call this act-token 's')
is causally necessary for the existence of c at t.
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But it follows from 4 and 5 that
8.

fis not identical to s.

And it follows from 1, 6, and 8 that
9.

s is not causally necessary for the existence of c at t,

which of course contradicts 7.
Since the truth of 1-4 is incompatible with the Social Theory of the Trinity,
Social Trinitarians are obliged to find some reason for rejecting, or at least
doubting, one of the premises of the Causal Argument. It would be fruitless
for the Social Theorist to vent her scepticism on either 2 or 3, for a being
which lacked sovereignty over the created world could scarcely count as
almighty. An almighty being has the ability to bring about a creature without
the assistance of anyone or anything else, and no creature is independent of
that being for its existence at even a single moment. So the only way for the
Social Trinitarian to discredit the Causal Argument and remain faithful to her
own view is to find something wrong with either 1 or 4.

II
As it happens, some Christian theologians may have suggested that the
Trinity is an exception to premise 4. Consider, for example, this remark by
Gregory of Nyssa:
... the action of each[-Father, Son, and Holy Spirit-]concerning anything
is not separate and peculiar, but whatever comes to pass, in reference either
to the acts of his providence for us, or to the government and constitution of
the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three .... The Holy Trinity
fulfils every operation in a manner similar to that of which I have spoken,
not by separate action according to the number of the persons, but so that
there is one motion and disposition of the good will which is communicated
from the Father through the Son to the Spirit. . .9

To be sure, Gregory is not trying to rebut the Causal Argument: he is responding to the accusation that Christians are compelled to believe in three Gods.
But whatever the purpose of this passage, and whatever Gregory may have
meant, it does lucidly express the traditional Trinitarian dictum of omnia
opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa, and it does at least hint at an interpretation of this dictum which can serve as an intriguing rejoinder to the
Causal Argument. For we might construe omnia opera Trinitatis to mean that
whenever the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit wills a particular effect ad
extra-a particular effect in the created world-all of the members of the
Trinity will this effect, and the effective volition of anyone of them is
token-identical to the effective volition of each of the other two. Thus, for
example, when the Trinity enlightens a human soul with knowledge on a
particular occasion, the Father's enlightening, the Son's enlightening, and the
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Spirit's enlightening are not three different act-tokens-they are numerically
one and the same. And since creating and sustaining creatures counts par
excellence as acting ad extra, we can extract the following principle from the
preceding suggestion:
The Identity Theory [of Divine Creation]. For any volition x, any creature y,
and any time t: if x is a volition of God the Father, God the Son, or God the
Holy Spirit and x is causally sufficient for the existence of y at t, then for
any z, if z is a volition of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit and z is
causally necessary for the existence of y at t, then z = x. \0
We should be careful to envisage this theory clearly, for it is easily confused
with other principles that are compatible with 4 and which therefore cannot
be used against the Causal Argument. It is especially important to realise that
the Identity Theory does not merely claim that many acts of Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit are type-identical-numerically distinct act-tokens of the same
kind, such as the millions of acts of voting that occur whenever a general
election is held in Great Britain. The relation which the Identity Theory
attributes to many acts of the various Trinitarian persons is the most intimate
relation imaginable: numerical sameness.
If the Identity Theory is defensible, then it will be easy for the Social
Trinitarian to parry the Causal Argument. She may concede premises 1, 2,
and 3; and 5, 6, and 7 follow from these premises and the Social Theory. But
without 4, the partisan of the Causal Argument is not entitled to 8; and without
8 he cannot derive a contradiction from Social Trinitarianism. Iff is identical
to s, then the Social Theory does not violate 1, for this premise does not
prevent one and the same act-token from being both causally necessary and
causally sufficient for the same effect-and nor will any other sensible causal
principle.
But is the Identity Theory defensible? No matter how coarse-grained a
criterion for individuating human act-tokens might tolerably be, it is exceedingly implausible to believe that an act-token of one human being is identical
to an act-token of another. Of course, human beings can perform joint actions.
But these are not exceptions to 4: for example, Tom's contribution to winning
a tennis doubles match is not numerically identical with the contribution of
his partner Jerry. The acts of the Trinity, however, are different from human
acts in a number of notable respects, and some of these dissimilarities make
an identity theory of Trinitarian actions seem more credible than an identity
theory of human actions. Consider two different oboists, each of whom plays
an A-440. First, we may observe that whereas we can distinguish each of the
act-tokens of each of the oboists by spatial or temporal location, we cannot use
these criteria to distinguish the volitions of the Trinity. Even if both oboists are •
sounding the same pitch at exactly the same moment, neither of them is playing
at precisely the same place. But obviously, any creative volition of one member
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of the Trinity which the Identity Theory would want to identify with some
creative volition of the others will not occur at a different time or place than
the latter. Traditional theism maintains that neither the Father's, nor the Son's,
nor the Spirit's willings are located in space; and even if each of these
volitions is temporal, each occurs at exactly the same time.
It might be replied that it is nevertheless possible for states of affairs to be
distinct even though they cannot be distinguished by spatio-temporal location. For instance, some philosophers do not ascribe spatiality to mental
events, and thus cannot use spatio-temporal criteria to distinguish two simultaneous occurrent beliefs with exactly the same content-as when a Tottenham fan and an Arsenal fan simultaneously acquire a belief that Tottenham
have just defeated Arsenal. But the Trinitarian can reply that we do resort to
other criteria to tell these beliefs apart-and these criteria cannot be used
against the Identity Theory. For example, in typical circumstances, the Totten ham fan's belief results in delight, whereas the Arsenal fan's belief results
in disappointment. lI On the other hand, it seems that any Trinitarian act-tokens which the Identity Theorist regards as numerically identical have exactly
the same effects. For nothing has resulted from the Father's work of creation
that has not also resulted from the Son's and the Spirit's. As Gregory says,
Yet although we set forth three persons and three names, we do not consider
that we have had bestowed upon [each one of] us three lives, one from each
person separately; but the same life is wrought in [each one of] us by the Father,
and prepared by the Son, and depends upon the will of the Holy Spirit.12

Furthermore, the Identity Theorist can avail herself of a noteworthy consequence of omnia opera Trinitatis:
10. For any possible world W, any being x, and any time t, if x is a creature
and x exists in W, then at least one person in the Trinity wills at t in W
the existence of x-at-t-in-W if and only if all three persons of the Trinity
will at t in W the existence of x-at-t-in-W.!3

And lest anyone object that 10 has been fabricated solely to avert the unwelcome conclusion of the Causal Argument, and could play no other role in
Trinitarian theology, the Identity Theorist has a convincing reply: 10 can be
justified by independent argumentation. In fact, we can do this by modifying
slightly the second premise of the Causal Argument.
First, let us assume that whatever is fully divine exists in all possible
worlds. This assumption, of course, is highly controversial; but at the cost of
greater complexity our argument could be recast without it. 14 We can then
change the modality of 2 into necessity de re:
2n. For any x, if x is divine, then for any possible world Wand any time t in
W, and for any creature y, if y exists at t in W then x's willing in W that
y exist-at-t-in-W is causally necessary for the existence of y at t in W.
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Now suppose that lOis false. Then it is possible that there is a creature who
exists at a time without all of the members of the Trinity willing its existenceat-that-time. And that would mean, contrary to 2n, that there is a divine person
whose volition at that time is not necessary for that creature's existence.
But 2n is at least worthy of belief. Apart from its intuitive plausibility, a
number of respectable lines of reasoning converge on it, such as many of the
modal cosmological arguments for the existence of God. The Identity Theorist is therefore entitled to 10. And with lOin hand, he can draw our attention
to another significant difference between Trinitarian and human acts. Let us
return to our example of the two oboists, each of whom is playing an A-440.
Clearly either of these playings could have existed without the other. And
that, according to the standard view of identity, gives us a conclusive reason
for denying that these playings are numerically identical. For on this view,
identities are metaphysically necessary-if a and b are numerically identical
at all, they are identical in every possible world in which they exist. Thus, if
a could have existed without b or vice versa, then a is not even possibly
identical with b. But according to 10, the divine act-tokens which the Identity
Theorist considers the same are necessarily coextensive. Now some philosophers have contended that propositions which are logically equivalentwhich are true in exactly the same possible worlds-are numerically
identical. And though this claim is not unobjectionable, neither is it obviously
incredible. It can seem reasonable, then, to hold that necessarily coextensive
act-tokens are numerically identical. And it can seem even more reasonable
to identify necessarily coextensive act-tokens that do not occur in different
times or different places and that do not have different effects.
Briefly put, we can shore up the Identity Theory with a host of appealing,
traditional theistic claims that enable it to withstand a number of decisive
objections to an identity theory of human act-tokens. It might therefore appear
that even Social Trinitarians are entitled to believe the Identity Theory. And
if that is true, then they have nothing to fear from the Causal Argument. 15

III
But the attractiveness of the Identity Theory evaporates under closer scrutiny-at the very least, it has consequences that are manifestly unpalatable
to the traditional Christian. Given one of the two currently plausible conceptions of free action, the Identity Theory is patently false; given the other, it
is incompatible with Christological orthodoxy.
Philosophers have by no means unanimously accepted a single theory of
the nature of free action, and so there is more than one way to gloss the Causal
Argument. But although philosophical disagreements in this area run deep,
it is generally agreed that at present there are only two conceptions of free
action with much initial plausibility-the so-called 'Agency Theory,' promi-
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nently advocated by, among others, Thomas Reid, C. A. Campbell, Richard
Taylor, and Roderick Chisholm; and a rival I shall call the 'Event-Causation
Theory,' notably defended by Donald Davidson and Alvin Goldman. 16
Consider first the Agency Theory. According to this view, no agent freely
brings about x if each of the causes of x is a state of affairs-and that includes
states of affairs involving the agent herself, such as the agent's own beliefs
and desires. Nor does an agent freely bring about x if x is uncaused. An agent
freely brings about x only if one of the causes of x is the agent herself-only
if, to use the words of some Agency Theorists, x is brought about by 'agentcausation' or 'immanent causation' rather than being brought about exclusively by 'event-causation' or 'transeunt causation.' The Agency Theory
enforces a sharp distinction between these two types of causation: agent-causation is not a form of event-causation, but is sui generis, unique, unanalysable. Even a complete list of the states of affairs that are causes of an effect
brought about by a free act would omit the one factor which makes the effect
the result of a free act: the agent.
Now no matter how murky the Agency Theory may be, at least one thing
is abundantly clear-if we apply this view to divine action, the Identity
Theory loses its charm. For the way to frame 2 in accordance with the Agency
Theory is this:
2a. For any x, if x is divine, then for every creature y and time t, x itself is
causally necessary for y's existing at t,17

whereas 3 becomes
3a. For any x, if x is divine and there exists one or more creatures, then for
some creature y and time t, x itself is causally sufficient for the existence
of y at t.

But then we do not even need 4 in order to deduce a contradiction from the
Social Theory. For given 3a and 5,
6a. At some time t, there exists a creature c such that God the Father himself
is causally sufficient for c's existence at t;

given 2a, 5, and 6a,
7a. God the Son himself is causally necessary for c's existence at t;

and given 1, 5, and 6a,
8a. God the Son himself is not causally necessary for c's existence at t. 18

The Agency Theory, however, is not above controversy. More than a few
philosophers have dismissed it as an account of human action: they have
maintained that its concept of a 'metaphysical self' which can exercise a
special kind of causal efficacy is hopelessly obscure, or that it makes the
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epistemology of singular action statements an inexplicable miracle, or that it
cannot explain why we attribute free and responsible acts to persons but not
to non-human animals, or that it cannot explain why we care deeply about
whether we are capable of acting freely, or that there is no way even in
principle of knowing whether the Agency Theory is empirically possible-et
cetera. 19 And some of these objections can be applied to the notion of God
as an agent-cause. We should therefore consider whether the Identity Theory
fares any better under an Event-Causation approach to divine action.
The Event-Causation theorist affirms what the Agency Theory denies-that
causation by agents is simply a special form of causation by states of affairs.
Whenever an agent freely brings about an effect, each of the causes of the
effect is a state of affairs-there are no 'agent-causes' over and above states
of affairs involving the agent herself. Of course, agents are causes. But they
exercise their causal efficacy only via their wants, beliefs, intentions, preferences, and other states of themselves.
Now an Event-Causation conception of divine action may seem more adept
at protecting the Social Trinitarian from the Causal Argument. For while no
act-token of one person of the Trinity can be numerically identical with any
act-token of another person if each of these persons is a causally efficacious
'metaphysical self,' it does appear much more plausible to identify the states
of the Trinitarian persons which are causally responsible for a creature's
existence. After all, a long and respectable tradition in Christian philosophical
theology regards all of the standard divine perfections as de re essential
characteristics of each member of the Trinity: not only are Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, and so forth, but each
possesses all of these perfections in every possible world in which he exists.
And there is a lot that can be said for the following claim:
I 1. Necessarily, for any x and any y, if x and y essentially possess all of the
divine perfections, then for any world W, any propositional-attitude type
A, and any time t: x has a propositional attitude of type A at t in W if and

only if y has a propositional attitude of type A at t in W.
(I understand propositional attitudes to be states of mind consisting in some
sort of stance vis-a-vis a proposition-for example, believing, or hoping, or
doubting, that there is rational life on other planets. It is not easy to state
exactly what it is for two propositional-attitude tokens to belong to the same
type, but for my purposes it is enough to say that two tokens are of the same
type just in case they both exemplify the same sort of stance-e.g. believing,
or rejecting, or suspending judgment-toward the same proposition.) Two
omniscient beings in the same world would not differ in any of their beliefs,
since each believes every truth and no falsehood. 20 Again, since each member
of the Trinity is essentially perfectly loving and wise, how could their wills
possibly conflict? But if we allow the Trinitarian both 11 and the Event-Causation
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view of divine action, the Identity Theory begins to look viable. Let partisans
of the Causal Argument choose a propositional attitude of the Father which
they wish to regard as a cause of a creature's existence at a particular time;
the Trinitarian may then ascribe a propositional attitude of the same type to
the Son and the Spirit, and may regard this attitude as a cause of the same
creature at the same time. And what is to stop even the Social Theorist from
identifying these attitudes-from considering them one instead of three? 11
guarantees that the Father's attitude exists in exactly the same possible worlds
as the Son's and the Spirit's. Moreover, as we have noted, traditional theology
guarantees that they have exactly the same effects, and that there is no spatial
or temporal difference between them. But if the Event-Causation Theory is
correct, what else need we regard as divine causes of creatures apart from
the propositional attitudes of the persons of the Trinity? It is beginning to
appear as if this conception of divine action will accommodate the Identity Theory, and therefore shelter the Social Trinitarian from the Causal
Argument.
But given that the Event-Causation theory of divine action is true, the
traditional Christian is committed to a theological proposition which prevents
the Trinity from being an exception to 4-the claim that only God the Son,
and not the Father or the Holy Spirit, became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth.
For the sake of convenience, let us call the relation of belonging to the same
person as the relation of copersonality.21 Then according to the orthodox
doctrine of the Incarnation, God the Son is copersonal with Jesus of Nazareth,
which implies that all of the states of God the Son are copersonal with a state
of Jesus of Nazareth. And although not every predicate expresses a genuine
property, any theory of properties with the slightest plausibility will admit
that 'being copersonal with a state of Jesus of Nazareth' does. Now states
which are numerically identical share all of their properties in common.
Hence, if any state of the Father is numerically identical with some state of
God the Son, then there is a state of the Father which is copersonal with some
state of Jesus of Nazareth. But then, of course, the Father is the same person
as Jesus; or in other words, contrary to received Christian teaching, the Father
also became incarnate in Jesus. The only way to avoid this unorthodox conclusion is to maintain that no state of the Father is copersonal with a state of
Jesus. However, since each of the states of God the Son is copersonal with a
state of Jesus, it follows by the Indiscernibility of Identicals that not a single
state of God the Father is numerically identical with any state of the Son.
And if 1, 2, and 3 are all true, then the traditional Trinitarian doctrine of
divine sovereignty cannot be reconciled with the Event-Causation theory of
divine action-for the Causal Argument will go through. If 3 is true, and
every state of the Father is distinct from every state of the Son, then there is
a causal chain leading from the Father to a creature which is sufficient for
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that creature's existing at t and which contains no state ofthe Son-otherwise,
the Father's causal activity would not be sufficient for that creature's existing
at t. But then, given 1, it follows that no causal chain containing a state of
the Son would be causally necessary for that creature's existing at t, for such
a chain could not be identical with, or a proper part of, the causal chain
leading from the Father to the creature.
The foregoing discussion of the Identi ty Theory has necessitated a welcome
clarification of the relation that must exist on a Social Trinitarian view between the ad extra acts of the different members of the Trinity. Although
virtually every Social Trinitarian has asserted that omnia opera Trinitatis ad
extra sunt indivisa, few of them have distinguished between the Identity
Theory and the weaker claim that the ad extra acts of the Trinity are typeidentical. 22 It might be thought that the Trinitarian owes no-one any obligation
to keep these claims distinct, for it might be supposed that nothing of any
importance hinges on the fate of the Identity Theory. Only those with an
inordinate fondness for counting entities should care about whether the ad
extra acts of the Trinity are one or three-the rest of us can safely ignore this
question. But that is emphatically not the case. If the Identity Theory were
serviceable, it would foil an impressive argument against Social Trinitarianism. But this theory is not serviceable-and therefore the Social Trinitarian
must learn how to live without it. If orthodox Christology is to be believed,
then whatever the divine causes of creatures-be it the special agent-causality
of the individual persons or their mental states-the Father's causal activity
is not numerically identical with the Son's, and neither the Son's nor the
Father's is numerically identical with the Spirit's. Since the theological commitments of the traditionally-minded Social Trinitarian prevent her from casting aspersions on 2, 3, or 4, she can only rebut the Causal Argument by
discrediting its first premise. Can she?

IV
It seems not. As we noted earlier, it appears obvious that 1 is a necessary
truth. Never mind that philosophers vigorously disagree about the nature of
causal necessity and causal sufficiency-that some regard causal necessity,
for example, as a kind of counterfactual dependence, some as suppressibility
by the interference of agents, others as necessary conditionship, yet others as
statistical relevance, and still others as unanalysable. And never mind that
proponents of the Causal Argument do not specify what they mean by causal
necessity and causal sufficiency. For it looks as if 1 will come out true no
matter what theories of causal concepts turn out to be satisfactory. How could
one state of affairs be causally necessary for an effect if a distinct and simultaneous state of affairs is causally sufficient for that same effect?
But in this case, as in so many others, appearances are deceiving: 1 is not
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at all as obvious as it may seem. We can sketch an account of divine causal
necessity and sufficiency which not only deserves serious consideration, but
also casts grave suspicions on the plausibility of 1. I will not be able to argue
that this account is reasonable and that it is incompatible with 1, so I will not
be able to prove that the Social Trinitarian can justifiably reject the Causal
Argument. But I think I will be able to mount a strong challenge to advocates
of this argument-they will need to show what is wrong with my reply if
they wish to continue maintaining that their argument discredits the Social
Theory of the Trinity.
I would prefer to block the Causal Argument by developing a well-motivated, defensible general analysis of causal necessity and sufficiency 'from
the ground up'-a general definition of these concepts that does not presuppose any unanalysed causal notions-and then showing that on this analysis,
it is possible for each of the simultaneous volitions of each of the members
of the Trinity to be causally necessary and yet also causally sufficient for the
existence of one and the same creature at one and the same time. This would
constitute as decisive a refutation of the Causal Argument as the Social
Trinitarian could hope for. But this would also require much more space than
I am permitted, and much more resourcefulness than I can command. Since
the rekindling of interest a generation ago in the analysis of singular causal
statements, it has proved notoriously difficult to come up with a theory of
causation that is demonstrably adequate-each attempt has provoked formidable objections to its tenability. Granted, one does not have to find an
adequate theory of causality in order to deal a considerable blow to the Causal
Argument-it would be enough to show that every account of causation taken
seriously at present will produce a definition of divine causal necessity and
sufficiency which permits each of the members of the Trinity to be sovereign.
But even this is too involved to attempt here. How unfortunate that the
Identity Theory of Divine Creation does not work-if only it did, the Social
Trinitarian could ignore the tortuous question of the nature of causality, since
she could dispense with the Causal Argument simply by disproving 4. But,
as Bernard Williams has said in another context, there is no road back from
reflectiveness.
On the other hand, I do not think it self-evident that the Social Trinitarian
must delve into general accounts of causality in order to show that 1 is rather
questionable. What if she begins instead by taking as primitive the concept
of divine ad extra causation-specifically, the notion that a divine being
brings about states of affairs in the created world by the exercise of its
agency-and presuming that this concept is at least prima facie free from
insurmountable difficulties? Suppose we once again conveniently assume
a volitional theory of action. Then what is obviously and irremediably
defective with the claim that a being with the divine attributes literally
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has volitions-willings that such-and-such a state of affairs occur-and these
volitions cause states of affairs that satisfy their propositional content-for
example, the divine volition that Eve exist-at-t brings about the existence of
Eve at t?
Granted, a number of well-known theories of causality would logically rule
out this claim. One example is the mechanistic account, which maintains that
states of affairs cannot be causally related unless they are spatio-temporally
contiguous. Another is the standard Humean theory, which insists that states
of affairs can be causally related only if they can be subsumed under a
contingent empirical law. Moreover, philosophers and theologians have often
argued that traditional theology is compelled to saddle God with properties
that are logically incompatible with acting in the world-such as timelessness, or immutability. But theories of causality that are inconsistent with
divine ad extra causation are anything but indubitable. And even if Christians
cannot remain orthodox unless they ascribe such properties as immutability
or timelessness to a divine being, it is very much an open question whether
these properties logically prevent an agent from bringing about effects in the
created world. 23
The Social Trinitarian, then, is permitted to suppose in the absence of
further evidence that there are no flagrant problems with the concept of divine
ad extra causation: even though God's bringing about the existence of a
creature is enormously different from a human being's bringing about the
existence of something, the two relations have enough in common for it to
be at least initially reasonable to regard the former as a genuine case of
causation. Naturally, more would have to be done to show that the notion of
divine ad extra causation is intellectually respectable. But since so many
attempts to prove otherwise have failed, it would be peremptory to prohibit
the Social Trinitarian from using this notion to fashion a reply to the Causal
Argument. Whatever conceptual problems may plague the idea of divine
causation in the world, they are by no means as egregious as the conceptual
problems which plague the idea that numbers, propositions, and other Platonica are capable of efficient causality. Furthermore, there is much we can
do to characterise the relation of divine ad extra causation even if we do not
attempt to analyse it from the ground up-we can point out that this relation
is necessarily irreflexive and necessarily asymmetrical, that it supports counterfactuals such as 'If God had not willed that Eve exist-at-t, Eve would not
have existed at t,' and so forth. I shall therefore take as primitive the notion
of divine ad extra causation, and shall suppose not only that it is prima facie
legitimate, but also that we understand it well enough to use it to fill out the
analyses of divine causal relations which I shall now present.
I begin with the analysis of divine causal necessity-an analysis clearly
inspired by counterfactual theories of causal dependence:
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12. For any states of affairs x and y and any possible world W, if x and y
obtain in Wand x is a divine volition that y obtain-in-W, then x is
causally necessary in W for y's obtaining-in-W if and only if it is true
in W that if x had not obtained, y would not have obtained.

This analysis, in conjunction with principles to which the Social Trinitarian
is firmly committed, has at least two consequences which are much to be
desired by traditional Christians. The first is jointly entailed by 12 and 2: for
every x, every y, and every time t, if x is a member of the Trinity, y is a
creature, and y exists at t, y would not have existed at t if x had not willed
at t that y exist-at-t. The second is that whenever the volition of one member
of the Trinity at t is causally necessary for a creature's existence at t, each of
the corresponding volitions of the other members of the Trinity at t is also
causally necessary for that creature's existence at t. For according to every
credible semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the following inference is
deductively valid:
I-I. If p had not been the case, then q would not have been the case;
p is logically equivalent to r-that is, p and r are true in exactly the

same possible worlds;
therefore, if r had not been the case, q would not have been the case.

Since 1-1 is valid, so is any instance of it, including the following argumentform:
1-2. If Trinitarian person P had not willed at t the existence of creature c-at-t,
then c would not have existed at t;
p's willing at t the existence of c-at-t is logically equivalent to Trinitarian
person Q's willing at t the existence of c-at-t;

therefore, if Q had not willed at t the existence of c-at-t, c would not
have existed at t.

And since 1-2 is also valid, any instance of it is also valid, no matter which
Trinitarian names we substitute for 'P' and for 'Q,' and no matter which
creaturely name we substitute for 'c.' But any instance of the first premise
of 1-2 will be jointly entailed by Social Trinitarianism, 2, and 12. And any
instance of the second premise of 1-2 is a consequence of 10, which, as we
have seen, the Social Trinitarian is fully entitled to believe.
Of course, general counterfactual theories of causality face several imposing difficulties, notably the problem of distinguishing genuinely causal from
merely logical relations of dependence. But of course, 12 does not try to
define divine causal sufficiency without presupposing any causal notions, so
12 does not try to distinguish genuinely causal divine sufficiency from other
forms of divine sufficiency. It may be helpful at this point to recall Saul
Kripke's memorable remarks against those who raise sceptical doubts about
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the possibility of trans-world identification of individuals. As Kripke notes,
these doubts often arise from talking of possible worlds as if they were distant
and unfamiliar places we must view through a special kind of telescope, so
that first we see objects in other possible worlds which look somewhat similar
to objects in our own world, and then we agonise over whether the objects
in the other worlds are identical to any objects in our own. But this sort of
talk is patently ridiculous. And it is just as ridiculous to fancy that once the
Social Trinitarian stipulates that a possible world contains both a creature c
which exists at t and a divine volition that c exist-at-t, we have to peer at that
world through a telescope to ascertain whether the divine volition brings
about the existence of c-at-t. Given such a divine volition and such a state of
affairs, it follows that the volition is an efficient cause of the state. 12, then,
merely tells us what needs to be added to this causal relation in order for the
divine volition to be causally necessary for the state.
However, 12 does invite an objection that the Social Trinitarian cannot
brush aside so easily: even if a divine ad extra volition and a state of affairs
satisfying its propositional content are related in the way specified by 12, and
this relation counts as causality, it still does not count as causal necessity.
Since this objection is too troublesome for a summary dismissal, I shall have
to leave it for another occasion. Nonetheless, the Social Trinitarian can say
much in her defence. For instance, she can quite easily distinguish divine
creation and preservation from many kinds of counterexamples to the sufficiency of various counterfactual analyses of causal necessity. In the divine
case, the volition that a creature exist is not a constituent part of the creature's
existing; in the divine case, God does not do one action by doing another,
because the state of affairs that is counterfactually dependent upon the divine
willing is not even an action; and given at least a rudimentary understanding
of divine ad extra causation, we need not worry about disambiguating the
direction of causation-it is simply analytic that a divine volition is causally
prior to a state of affairs that satisfies the propositional content of the volition.
Furthermore, perhaps the Social Trinitarian can also say that in cases in which
it is evident to naive intuition that neither of two simultaneous causes of a
state of affairs is causally necessary for that state, the effect is not counterfactually dependent on either of its causes, whereas the existence of a creature
at a time, as we have seen, is counterfactually dependent upon each of the
relevant volitions of each of the persons in the Trinity. In the switch case
mentioned earlier, for example, it is not true of either switch that if it had not
been flipped, the light would not have come on, because according to the
usual comparative-similarity semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the
light comes on in those possible worlds closest to the actual world in which
one of the switches is not flipped. And perhaps this could help to justify the
Social Trinitarian's conviction that each of the relevant Trinitarian volitions
is causally necessary for the existence of a creature. 24
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As for divine causal sufficiency, my analysis is reminiscent of the neoHumean regularity theory, which contends that one state of affairs is causally
sufficient for another just in case the obtaining of the first state, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entails the obtaining of the second, but neither
the obtaining of the first state nor the laws of nature alone entail the obtaining
of the second. Of course, the regularity theory will not do as it stands for an
analysis of divine causal sufficiency, since it would imply that a divine volition by itself cannot be causally sufficient for anything. But we can overcome this problem once we are allowed to use our unanalysed concept of
divine ad extra causality: we can maintain that what makes a case of divine
causality into a case of divine sufficient causation is simply that the di vine
volition entails that its effect obtains, so that God's causal sufficiency is not
subject to the laws of nature. In other words,
13. For any states of affairs x and y and any possible world W, if x and y
obtain in Wand x is a divine volition that y obtain-in-W, then x is
causally sufficient for y in W if and only if there is no possible world
in which x obtains but y does not obtain.
This principle follows from a claim that is endorsed by a great many
traditional theists-that it is a de re essential property of any individual that
is divine that its will is unimpedable, i.e. it is not possible for it to will a state
of affairs without that state's coming to pass. And 13, like 12, entails, in
conjunction with other central beliefs of Social Trinitarianism, a consequence
that traditional Christians will welcome: it logically guarantees that if one
member of the Trinity has a volition at t which is causally sufficient for the
existence of a creature at t, then the other two members of the Trinity will
each have a volition at t which is also causally sufficient for the existence of
that creature at t. For necessarily, given any states of affairs x, y, and z, if x
entails y and z is necessarily coextensive with x, then z also entails x. And
according to 10, it is a necessary truth that, for any volition of a Trinitarian
person at a time t which entails the existence of a creature at t, there is a
volition of each of the other Trinitarian persons at t which also entails the
existence of that creature at t.
And if 12 and 13 are both acceptable, then 1 is, at the very least, questionable. For it is scarcely axiomatic that one and the same state of affairs cannot
be both individually entailed by each of two other states of affairs and also
counterfactually dependent upon each of them. In fact, according to one
respected criterion for the individuation of states of affairs, there are many
such states which obtain in the actual world. For instance, the number of my
eyes being 2, the number of my eyes being the smallest even positive integer,
and the number of my eyes being the smallest positive prime number are all
distinct states of affairs, yet the first is both entailed by and counterfactually
dependent upon the second, and is both entailed by and counterfactually
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dependent upon the third. Now of course this criterion is disputable; and even
if it were not, the relations of entailment and counterfactual dependence
between these states of affairs, unlike the dependence of creatures on God,
are symmetrical. But why should this worry the Social Trinitarian? It may
well mean that Trinitarian causation of creatures is unique in this respect-but
what is wrong with that? Why should we believe that a state of affairs cannot
be both asymmetrically entailed by each of two other states of affairs and
also asymmetrically counterfactually dependent on each of them? Hence,
contrary to what proponents of the Causal Argument have heretofore supposed, 1 cannot be effortlessly extracted from our concepts of causal necessity and causal sufficiency.
This completes my reply to the Causal Argument. I concede that I have not
refuted it. But I think I have cast considerable doubt on its cogency. Those
who believe in it must explain why the Social Trinitarian is not entitled to
12 and 13-or why 1 is plausible even if she is. If no such explanation can
be given, then she may safely repudiate the Causal Argument: if there be any
convincing reasons for denying the coherence of her claim that there is more
than one God who exercises sovereign power over the created world, these
reasons will not arise from any account of causal necessity and sufficiency
that we are obliged to believe. If these concepts will not forbid us to say,
There be one Lord, they will not forbid us to say, There be more than one. 25
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for instance, are in the habit of using both hands to close a drawer, even though one hand
would do. Suppose that someone has a deeply engrained habit of this sort. Then, on a
certain occasion when he pushes with both hands on a drawer at t and the drawer moves
at t-plus-delta, it might well be true of each hand that, if he had not pushed the drawer
with that hand at t, the drawer would not have moved at t-plus-delta. For if his habit of
two-handed pushing is especially deeply engrained, then, given the supposition that he
does not push the drawer at t with both hands, it would be less of a departure from actuality
to imagine that he simply does not push the drawer at t than to imagine that he pushes the
drawer at t with only one hand. But perhaps we can still find a relevant difference between
this kind of case and the Trinity. In the preceding example, it is false that, if the man had
pushed the drawer with only one of his hands, the drawer would have stayed where it
was-in the absence of only one of the two sets of sufficient conditions, the drawer would
have moved anyway. But it does not seem to be false that, if one ofthe Trinitarian willings
had been present but another absent, the effect would have obtained anyway. After all, the
antecedent of this counterfactual is logically impossible, and therefore, on all of the
standard semantics, the counterfactual itself is vacuously true. I do not regard this reply
as conclusive, but I do think it is worthy of further investigation.
25. I am grateful to the editor and one of his referees for helpful criticism of an earlier
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